Abstract. Zero-sum games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are considered with underlying dynamics being given by controlled stochastic differential equations. Under the assumption of geometric stability on the dynamics, we completely characterize all possible saddle point strategies in the class of stationary Markov controls. In addition, we also establish existence-uniqueness result for the value function of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation.
Introduction
This article concerns with zero-sum game for risk-sensitive costs where the underlying dynamics of the players are given by non-degenerate controlled stochastic differential equations. There are two players, one of them tries to minimize his/her payoff and the other one tries to maximize it. The maximizing player may be thought of as nature who may choose a parametrization of the model to be totally adverse to the other controller, in a non-anticipative way. The admissible controls (or actions) of each player are assumed to take values in a space of probability measures over a compact metric space. In other words, each player chooses his/her control from a given collection of mixed strategies. As the system evolves, the costs are accumulated and the performance of a control policy is measured by a long-run average of risk-sensitive cost criterion. The main objective of this work is to find solution for the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation characterizing the value of the game and rendering saddle point strategies. The key results of this article can be roughly described as follows.
• Existence and Uniqueness of solution. The HJI equation has an eigenpair (V, λ) ∈ C 2 (R d ) × R where λ is the value of the game. Moreover, this solution is unique.
• Verification result. Any measurable mini-max selector of the HJI equation form a saddle point strategy, and any saddle point strategy in the class of stationary Markov controls can be obtained as a measurable mini-max selector of the HJI equation. Risk-sensitive (or exponential-of-integral) control has been an active area of research in the field of control theory. These problems were introduced by Jacobson [26] in seventies. We also refer to Whittle [33] and references therein for an early account of the risk-sensitive control literature. Most of these problems have concentrated on minimizing the risk-senstive payoff. Among the most relevant to the present are [2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 20, 31] . On the other hand the number of literature on stochastic differential games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are very few [6, 8, 18, 21] . Başar [6] considers non-zero sum game with finite horizon risk-sensitive costs and establishes existence of Nash equilibrium whereas Ghosh et.al. [21] obtain existence of Nash equilibrium with long-run average of risk-sensitive payoff. Both zero-sum and nonzero-sum games with finite horizon risk-sensitive cost criterion have been considered by El-Karoui and Hamadène [18] where the authors have used backward stochastic differential equation to prove existence of a saddle-point and an equilibrium point for respectively, the zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. In a recent work Basu and Ghosh [8] consider a zero-sum game with long-run average of risk-sensitive cost and adopt the standard vanishing discount approximation to establish existence of saddle points which are mini-max selector of the associated HJI equation. This work is done with bounded drift, diffusion coefficient and cost functions. After a careful reading we have found that the proofs of [8] (see Theorem 3 and 4 there) contain some crucial error that do not seem to have an easy fix. In [8] the authors have constructed an eigenpair for the HJI equation and have made an attempt to show that this eigenvalue is the value of the game. But this can not be true as a recent work of Berestycki and Rossi [9] suggests that there are uncountably many eigenvalues (for the uncontrolled linear operator) with positive eigenfunctions. Therefore, one has to look for the principal eigenvalue of HJI equation. In particular, one has to show that the eigenvalue obtained by the vanishing discount method is actually the principal eigenvalue for the HJI equation. We show in this article that under certain conditions, the value of the game can be seen as the principal eigenvalue of the HJI equation. This problem is closely related to the charatecterization of the principal eigenvalue (or optimal value) for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB) type equations which have been studied by several authors recently [3, 28, 24] . Let us also mention [7, 17, 27] where eigenvalue type problems for the HJB equation related to the the ergodic control problems in R d are studied.
In this article we consider a large class (compared to [8] ) of control problems. We prove not only the existence of a saddle point strategy, but also characterize all possible saddle point strategies in the class of stationary Markov controls. In addition, we also obtain the uniqueness of the value function for the HJI equations. To find the principal eigenpair of the HJI equation we start with the Dirichlet eigenvalue value problems in bounded domains where existence of principal eigenpair is known and then increase these domains to R d . This idea was used earlier by Biswas in [10] but for a simpler setting. The approach of [8, 21] is based on parabolic PDE where one introduces an additional risk-sensitive parameter θ multiplied with the running cost and studies the associated parabolic PDE, viewing θ as a time parameter. It seems this approach is not very much helpful in studying our game problem whereas the eigenvalue approach of [10] (see also [17] ) seems more natural in current situation. Another advantage in using the latter approach is the ease in obtaining stochastic representation of the value functions which helps us to apply strong maximum principle. It should be kept in mind that [10] deals with a minimization problem and it does not discuss characterization of the optimal stationary Markov controls. It turns out that the game problem is much more involved than the minimization problem. One of the reasons for this difficulty is that our game is a generalization to both minimization and maximization problems with risk-sensitive cost, and it is not easy to convert a maximization problem to a minimization problem of the same type. Therefore, we separately study the maximization problem with risk-sensitive costs in Section 3 (see Theorem 3.1) and characterize the optimal stationary Markov controls.
We borrow several results from [3] where an interesting characterization of the strict monotonicity property of the principal eigenvalues of second order elliptic operators has been studied. Using this characterization the authors then study a minimization problem in [3] for the risk-sensitive cost. We also use the stochastic representation formula of the principal eigenfunction from [3] . The problem we consider in this article does not follow in a straightforward manner from [3] and the level of technical difficulties is also more involved. For instance, in case of the minimization problem it is seen in [3, 10] that any limit of the principal eigenvalues of the HJB operator considered in bounded domains, as the domains increase to R d , is suboptimal, and therefore, by choosing a selector of the HJB one proves that the limiting eigenvalue is actually the principal one and hence, it has to be optimal. But this simple policy does not seem to work for the maximization problem. So to study the maximization problem we first perturb the cost to a norm-like running cost and show that the maximization problem can be solved for this perturbed cost. Then using some stability estimate we could show that it is possible to pass to the limit and solve the original maximization problem (see Lemma 3.4 and 3.5 below).
Rest of the article is organized as follows. In the remaining part of this section we summarize the notations. Section 2 introduces the problem setup and the main result. In section 3, we study a maximization problem with risk-sensitive criterion, and finally section 4 deals with the proof of the main Theorem.
Notation. The standard Euclidean norm in R d is denoted by | · |. The set of nonnegative real numbers is denoted by R + , N stands for the set of natural numbers, and 1 denotes the indicator function. Given two real numbers a and b, the minimum (maximum) is denoted by a ∧ b (a ∨ b), respectively. The closure, boundary, and the complement of a set A ⊂ R d are denoted byĀ, ∂A, and A c , respectively. We denote by τ(A) the first exit time of the process {X t } from the set A ⊂ R d , defined by
The open ball of radius r in R d , centered at the origin, is denoted by B r , and we let τ r := τ(B r ), andτ r := τ(B c r ). The term domain in R d refers to a nonempty, connected open subset of the Euclidean space 
, stands for the Banach space of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions f satisfying D |f (x)| p dx < ∞, and L ∞ (D) is the Banach space of functions that are essentially bounded in D. We shall use the notation · ∞ to denote the L ∞ norm on the underlying domain. The standard Sobolev space of functions on D whose generalized derivatives up to order k are in L p (D), equipped with its natural norm, is denoted by
In general, if X is a space of real-valued functions on D, X loc consists of all functions f such that f ϕ ∈ X for every ϕ ∈ C ∞ c (D), the space of smooth functions on D with compact support. In this manner we obtain for example the space W for i, j ∈ N. We often use the standard summation rule that repeated subscripts and superscripts are summed from 1 through d. For example,
Settings and main results
The following assumptions (A1)-(A3) on the controlled diffusion (2.1) will be in effect throughout this article unless otherwise mentioned.
(A1) Local Lipschitz continuity: The function
are locally Lipschitz in x (uniformly in the other two variables for b) with a Lipschitz constant C R > 0 depending on R > 0. In other words, we have
We also assume that the action spaces U i , i = 1, 2, are compact metric spaces and b is jointly continuous in (x, u). (A2) Affine growth condition: b and σ satisfy a global growth condition of the form
for some constant C 0 > 0, where
and for all ξ = (ξ 1 , .
Set of all probability measures on U i is denoted byŨ i , i = 1, 2. In our control model we have two players andŨ i denotes the relaxed action space for the the i-th player, i = 1, 2. We extend the drift b :
It is easy to verify that the extended drift satisfies (A1)-(A2) with U i replaced byŨ i , i = 1, 2. One major advantage of this extension is that b(x, ·, ·) :Ũ 1 ×Ũ 2 → R d becomes coordinatewise convex. This extension would play a key role in the selection of saddle point below.
The controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) is given by
where W is a standard d-dimensional Wiener process on some complete, filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t }, P), and U i is anŨ i valued process satisfying following admissibility condition: for s < t, the completion of σ{U i r , W r : r ≤ s, i = 1, 2} relative to {F, P} is independent of W t − W s . Let us clarify that we do not fix any probability space a priori and this is an important technical point which allow as to consider a fairly large class of admissible control. It is well known that given a complete, filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t }, P) with a Wiener process W , under (A1)-(A3), for any progressively measurable (U 1 , U 2 ) there exists a unique solution of (2.1) [4, Theorem 2.2.4]. We define the family of operators Lũ :
, whereũ ∈Ũ 1 ×Ũ 2 plays the role of a parameter, by
By a stationary Markov control for the i-th player we mean a control of the form
By an abuse of notation we will refer to v i as stationary Markov control. Let U SM i denote the set of all stationary Markov controls for the i-th player. It is well known that under v i ∈ U SM i (2.1) has a unique strong solution [23] .
, the process X is strong Markov, and we denote its transition kernel by P t v (x, · ). It also follows from the work in [13] that under v ∈ U SM 1 × U SM 2 , the transition probabilities of X have densities which are locally Hölder continuous. Thus L v defined by
we use v as subscript in L v to distinguish it from Lũ, u ∈Ũ 1 ×Ũ 2 , defined in the preceding paragraph. We let P v x denote the probability measure and E v x the expectation operator on the canonical space of the process under the control v ∈ U SM 1 × U SM 2 , conditioned on the process X starting from x ∈ R d at t = 0. For every i the set U SM i is metrizable with a compact metric [4, Section 2.2.4], [14] . In fact,
is said to be stable if the associated process is positive recurrent i.e.,
. It is known that for a non-degenerate diffusion the property of positive recurrence is independent of domain, i.e., if it holds for one domain D then it also holds for every domain [4, Theorem 2.6.10].
Let us now introduce the set of all admissible controls for our game problem. We follow the approach of [15, 30] . A control is called a feedback control if it is progressively measurable with respect to the natural filtration generated by X. More precisely, we say U i is of feedback form if for some measurable
It should be noted that stationary Markov controls are also feedback controls. The set of all feedback controls for the i-th player is denoted by U i , i = 1, 2. We also refer the members of U i as admissible controls. By [4, Theorem 2.2.11] we know that for any (U 1 , U 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 (2.1) has a unique weak solution.
A Borel measurable function ℓ : R d → R is said to be inf-compact if for any κ ∈ R the set {x ∈ R d : ℓ(x) ≤ κ} is compact. It is clear that for any inf-compact function ℓ we have lim |x|→∞ ℓ(x) = ∞. For a locally bounded function f : R d → R and (U 1 , U 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , the risk-sensitive average is defined to be
The running cost function for our problem is given by a continuous function c :
which is locally Lipschitz continuous in its first argument uniformly with respect to u ∈ U 1 × U 2 . Without loss of generality we assume that c is non-constant function. As earlier we extend c over
In this article the cost criterion is given by E x (c, U 1 , U 2 ), and for notational economy we shall drop the notation c and denote it by E x (U 1 , U 2 ). We also define
Therefore the upper and lower value of the game are respectively defined as Λ = inf
The game is said to have a value if we havē Λ = Λ = Λ (say).
The reader might have observed that we do not write Λ (orΛ, Λ) as a function of x. We show that under certain stability hypothesis (assumed below), the value of the game is independent of x. Let us now introduce two set of stability assumptions (Conditions 2.1 and 2.2) that will be used in this article. These conditions are generally referred to as the geometric stability conditions and have been heavily used in the study of discrete and continuous time Markov control problems. In the context of risk-sensitive controls similar conditions have been used by [3, 8, 11, 20] .
for some compact K ⊂ R d and constant β. Moreover, the cost function c is bounded, and
Example 2.1. Suppose a = Id and
Taking V(x) = exp(|x|) for |x| ≥ 1, we have
Note that V in Example 2.1 is inf-compact. Below we produce an example where V is not inf-compact. 
for some constant β and a compact set K. Moreover, the cost function c belongs to C ℓ where
≤ θ for some θ ∈ (0, 1) .
ℓ being inf-compact it is easy to see that for c ∈ C ℓ , ℓ − max u∈U 1 ×U 2 c(x, u) is infcompact. Let us remark that if a, b are bounded functions one can not expect (2.6) to hold. See for instance the Remark 3.4 in [3] . Example 2.3. Let σ be bounded and b :
Then, V(x) = exp(|x| θα ) for |x| ≥ 1, satisfies (2.6) for sufficiently small θ > 0, and ℓ ∼ |x| 2α−1 . Note that α = 2, σ = Id is considered in [20] in the context of minimization problem with risk-sensitive criterion.
Let us now state the main result of this article 
Moreover, we have the following (i) Λ in (2.7) is the value of game i.e.,Λ = Λ = Λ.
(ii) If v * 2 is an outer maximizing selector of 8) and v * 1 is an outer minimizing selector of
is a saddle point strategy i.e.,
(iii) The eigenfunction V is unique in the class
is a saddle point strategy in the above sense thenv 1 is an outer minimizing selector of (2.9) andv 2 is an outer maximizing selector of (2.8).
For existence of measurable selector we refer the readers to [1, Chapter 18] . Such existence of measurable selector will be used in several places in this article. Also note that by [19, Theorem 3] , the left hand sides of (2.8) and (2.9) are equal. The proof of Theorem 2.1 is established in Section 4 below.
Before we conclude this section let us recall the definition of principal eigenvalue from [9] . Let
whereb,ĉ are locally finite, Borel measurable functions,â is continuous and satisfies (A3).
Then the principal eigenvalue of L is defined to be
The following result is proved in [ 
A maximization problem
In this section we study a maximization problem which will play a key role in our analysis.
be Borel measurable functions that are locally finite and continuous in u 2 for every fixed x. Moreover, b and σ satisfies (A2)-(A3). We also assume that σ satisfies (A1). As earlier we consider the relaxed action spaceŨ 2 and extend b, r overŨ 2 . Then the main result of this section is the following Theorem 3.1. Suppose that one of the following holds.
(H1) (2.4) holds and r ∞ < γ. (H2) (2.6) holds with some continuous, inf-compact ℓ and
Moreover, we have the following:
r(Xs,U 2 s ) ds .
(ii) Any measurable selector of (3.2) is an optimal stationary Markov control, i.e., if v * 2 is a measurable maximizer of (3.2) then we have
(iv) Any optimal stationary Markov control is a measurable selector of (3.2).
A similar minimization problem with long-run average of risk sensitive cost has been studied in [3, Theorem 4.1 and 4.2]. As we mentioned earlier it is not obvious that one can change a maximization problem to a minimization problem of same type. Therefore proof Theorem 3.1 does not follow from [3] . We think Theorem 3.1 would be of independent interest. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is divided in several lemmas.
In what follows B n denotes the open ball of radius n around 0. Following result follows from [32, Theorem 1.1 and Remark 3] Lemma 3.1. There exists a (unique) positive ϕ n ∈ W 2,p loc (B n ) ∩ C(B n ), p ∈ (1, ∞), and α n ∈ R such that ϕ n (0) = 1 and
Moreover, α n < α n+1 for all n ∈ N.
Let v * 2,n be a measurable selector of (3.3). Then
Since ϕ n (0) = 1, by Harnack's inequality [22, Corollary 9 .25] and (3.4) we have for any compact set K ⊂ B n , sup
for some constant C(K), not depending on n but depends on K and the constants in (A1)-(A3). Therefore using standard Sobolev estimate [22, Theorem 9 .11] in (3.4) we obtain {ϕ n : n ≥ 1} uniformly bounded in W 2,p (K), p > d. By a standard diagonalization argument we can extract a subsequence of {ϕ n : n ≥ 1} that converges to some
, and weakly in W 2,p loc (R d ), p > 1. Therefore we have the following lemma Lemma 3.2. Suppose that either (H1) or (H2) of Theorem 3.1 holds. Then the sequence {α n : n ≥ 1} is bounded above. Moreover, if (V, λ max ) is any sub-sequential limit of (ϕ n , α n ), then we have
Proof. Let us first show that {α n } is bounded above. Let v * 2,n be a measurable selector of (3.3). Extend the Markov control in R d be settings v * 2,n (x) = u 2 for all x ∈ B c n where 
[r(Xs,v * 2,n (Xs))−αn] ds .
Therefore taking logarithm on both sides, diving by T and letting T → ∞ we get
Under condition (H1) we have r bounded and thus
Suppose condition (H2) holds. It is easy to see from (2.6) that sup
Combining these with (3.7) we have α n ≤ κ 1 , for all n ≥ 1, and for some constant κ 1 .
Hence first part of the lemma follows from (3.8).
Since {α n : n ≥ 1} is bounded above, λ max = lim n→∞ α n exists. Let V be a subsequential limit of ϕ n as obtained above. Since ϕ n → V in C 1,α loc (R d ) we have, for any compact set K, (3.9) tending to 0, as n → ∞. Now let χ be a smooth function with compact support. Then using the observation in (3.9) and using (3.3) we obtain, as n → ∞,
Since χ is arbitrary and
It is easy to see that V ≥ 0 and V (0) = 1. Therefore by an application of Harnack's inequality in the above equation we get V > 0 in R d . Hence the proof.
Next we show that V has a stochastic representation. 
Applying Itô-Krylov formula [29, p. 122] to (3.12) we obtain for any T > 0 and for any n, that
Letting T → ∞, and n → ∞ in (3.13) and applying Fatou's lemma twice we get
where we have used the fact (r − λ max ) ≥ 0 which follows from the fact that r ≥ 0 and λ max < 0. Therefore we have min R d V > 0. Again a further application of Itô-Krylov formula [29, p. 122] to (3.12), followed by Fatou's lemma, gives us
Now taking logarithm on both sides, diving by T and letting T → ∞ we obtain
2 ) ≥ 0. But this is contradicting the fact that λ max < 0. Hence we have λ max ≥ 0.
First we note that there exists a compact set B andθ ∈ (0, 1) such that under (H1)
and under condition (H2), max u∈U 2 r(x, u) − λ max <θ ℓ(x), for all x ∈ B c . (3.15) (3.14) follows from the fact 0 ≤ λ max ≤ r ∞ < γ whereas (3.15) follows from (3.1). Since α n → λ max it is easy to see that we can findθ ∈ (0, 1) such that (3.14) (and (3.15)) holds true when λ max is replaced by α n for all large n. Letτ denote the hitting time to B. Without loss of generality we may assume B ⊃ K where K is same as in (2.4) and (2.6). We give the proof using (3.14), and the proof using (3.15) follows by repeating the same argument. ϕ n being positive we note that α n is the principal eigenvalue of the elliptic operator on the LHS of (3.4). Thus using (3.4) and stochastic representation from [2, Lemma 2.10(i)] we have, for x ∈ B c and B ⊂ B n , for all n sufficiently large
for some constant κ 2 , where the last inequality follows applying Itô's formula to (2.4). Note that κ 2 can be chosen independent of n, by (3.5) thanks to the Harnack's inequality. Now we proceed to show the stochastic representation (3.11). Fix the compact set B as chosen in (3.14) and (3.15). Let B 1 be a compact ball containing B andτ 1 = τ(B c 1 ). As earlier we show (3.11) under assertion (H1) and the proof under condition (H2) would be analogous. Applying Itô-Krylov formula to (3.12) we obtain, for any T > 0,
17) where τ n = τ(B n ) denotes the exit time from the ball B n . Since
by (2.4), and V is bounded in B c 1 ∩ B n , for every fixed n, letting T → ∞ in (3.17), we have
On the other hand, since
x e γ τn 1 {τ 1 >τn} ;
and by monotone convergence theorem the first two quantities converges to the same limit, we have
We denote by Γ(n, m) = {x ∈ ∂B n : V (x) ≥ m} for m ≥ 1. Then using (3.19)
by letting n → ∞ first and then letting m → ∞. Therefore letting n → ∞ in (3.18) we have (3.11) . Note that under (H2) in order to make analogous argument we use the fact that
1 , by (2.6). Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1. The idea of the proof is the following : First we perturb the cost to a norm-like cost and prove Theorem 3.1 for the perturbed version. Then passing to the limit we show that the limiting eigenfunction also has stochastic representation (3.11) and we use Lemma 3.3 as a key ingredient in proving the result.
Let us now introduce the perturbation of r, denoted by r m . For m ∈ N, let ζ m : R d → [0, 1] be a smooth function and satisfy ζ m (x) = 1 in B m , ζ m (x) = 0 in B c m+1 . For (H1), we choose δ small enough that so that r ∞ + δ < γ and define
For (H2), we define
Choose m large enough so that r m satisfies (3.1). Note that r m is locally finite, continuous inũ 2 for every fixed x. Also Lemma 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 holds with r replaced by r m . Thus we can find an eigenpair (
Lemma 3.4. The solution V m of (3.20) is bounded from below i.e., min
Proof. Fix m. We claim that there exists a compact set K such that min u 2 ∈U 2 r m (x, u 2 ) − λ 2,m ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K c . This obvious when r m is unbounded, as defined under condition (H2). Thus we prove the claim under condition (H1) where r m is bounded. Note that r m = r ∞ + δ for x ∈ B c m+1 . Let v * 2,m be a measurable selector of (3.20 
This proves that min
Taking logarithm on both sides, dividing by T and letting T → ∞, we get
U 2 in U 2 being arbitrary we have (3.21), using the above display and the fact λ 2,m = E x (r m , v * 2,m ).
Let us fix V m (0) = 1. Recall that v * 2,m is a measurable selector of (3.20) i.e.
Therefore applying Harnack's inequality and Sobolev estimate, as earlier, on (3.22) it is easy to see that the sequence {V m } is uniformly bounded in W 
Again the arguments of Lemma 3.3 shows that V m (x) ≤ κ 2 (V(x))θ,θ ∈ (0, 1), uniformly in m outside a compact set (see (3.16) ) and therefore, by an analogous calculation the limit V also has stochastic representation. Summarizing we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 hold. There exists an eigenpair (V,
, such that V > 0, and
There exists a compact set B such that for any measurable selector v * 2 of (3.23) and any compact ball B 1 ⊃ B we have
24)
and any measurable selector of (3.23) is an optimal stationary Markov control.
Proof. Select (V, λ max ) as a sub-sequential limit of (V m , λ 2,m ). Then from the discussion preceding Lemma 3.5 we see that (3.23) and (3.24) hold. Also from the construction of r m we have r m ≥ r for all (x,ũ 2 ) ∈ R d ×Ũ. Therefore by (3.21) we have sup
Let v * 2 be a measurable selector of (3.23) i.e., . Combining this with Lemma 2.1 we note that λ max = E x (r, v * 2 ) for all x. Thus by (3.25), sup
and v * 2 is an optimal stationary Markov control. Let us now prove Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) and (ii) follows from Lemma 3.5. So we need to prove (iii) and (iv). To prove (iii) we assume that there exists positive
Let v * 2 be a measurable selector of (3.23). Using (3.27)
Applying Itô-Krylov formula to (3.28) , with the same compact ball B 1 as in (3.24), we obtain, for x ∈ B c 1 ,
Using (3.24) and (3.29) one has
Therefore if we multiply V by a suitable positive constant so that V − V is non-negative in B 1 and has its minimum 0 in B 1 , the above display indicates that V − V ≥ 0 in R d with its minimum in B 1 . On the other hand by (3.26) and (3.28) one has
Hence applying strong maximum principle [22, Theorem 9.6] one has V = V . This proves uniqueness.
Let us now prove (iv). Supposeṽ is an optimal stationary Markov control, i.e., E x (r,ṽ) = λ max . By [3 30) and λ max = E x (r,ṽ) for all x ∈ R d . MoreoverṼ will have stochastic representation with respect to some compact ball B. Now (3.23) gives
Applying Itô-Krylov formula we also havẽ
[r(Xs,ṽ(Xs))−λmax] ds V (Xτ) .
Therefore with the help of these stochastic representations and (3.30)-(3.31) we can follow the same argument as above (for uniqueness) to conclude that V =Ṽ . Thus the inequality in (3.31) is in fact an equality andṽ is a measurable selector of (3.23). Hence the proof.
Proof of the Theorem 2.1
In this section we prove Theorem 2.1. The proof is divided into several lemmas. All the results in this section are valid under any one of the Conditions 2.1 and 2.2. Recall that B n denotes the open ball of radius n around 0. By S we denote the set of all real symmetric matrices. Let F :
Note that F is linear in M when other variables are kept fixed. Then by [5, Theorem 2.2], [25] there exists an (unique) eigenpair (ψ n , λ n ) ∈ C 1,α loc (B n ) ∩ C(B n ) × R with ψ n > 0, such that F (D 2 ψ n , Dψ n , ψ n , x) = λ n ψ n , in B n , and ψ n = 0 on ∂B n . (4.1)
The above should be understood in the sense of viscosity solution. From the structure of F it easy to see that ψ n is a viscosity solution of
is locally Hölder continuous in B n . Therefore using (A1), (A3) and [16, Theorem 3] we get ψ n ∈ C 2,α loc (B n ) for some α > 0. We start with the following lemma. Lemma 4.1. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. For every n ∈ N there exists an eigenpair (ψ n , λ n ) ∈ C 2 (B n ) ∩ C(B n ) × R with ψ n > 0 satisfying (4.1). Moreover, the set {λ n : n ∈ N} is bounded.
Proof. In view of the discussion above we only need to show that {λ n : n ∈ N} is a bounded set. Note that by [19, Theorem 3] 
Let v n 2 be a outer maximizing selector of the LHS above and v n 1 be a outer minimizing selector of RHS above. It is easy to check that 1 2
Extend the Markov controls in R d by setting v n 1 (x) = u 1 and v n 2 (x) = u 2 for all x ∈ B c n where (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈Ũ 1 ×Ũ 2 is fixed. Let τ n = τ(B n ). Then appying Itô's formula to (4.2) we have, for x ∈ B n and v n = (v n 1 , v n 2 ),
Therefore taking logarithm on both sides, diving by T and letting T → ∞, we get
Under Condition 2.1 we have c bounded and thus
Suppose Condition 2.2 holds. It is easy to see from (2.6) that
Since c ∈ C ℓ , max u∈U 1 ×U 2 c(·, u) ≤ κ + ℓ(·) for some positive κ. Hence
Combining these with (4.3) we have λ n ≤ κ 1 , for all n ≥ 1, and for some constant κ 1 .
Thus it remains to show that the set {λ n : n ∈ N} is also bounded from below. We define the elliptic operator L n as
Then from (4.2) we see that (ψ n , λ n ) is the principal eigenpair of L n for the Dirichlet problem in B n . Ifλ n denote the principal eigenvalue of L n in B 1 then by monotonicity property of principal eigenvalues (with respect to domains ordered with respect to set inclusion, see for instance [9] ) we know that λ n ≥λ n . On the other hand by [32, Proposition 4.1] there exists a constant κ 0 , independent of n, such thatλ n ≥ κ 0 . Thus λ n ≥ κ 0 for all n. This completes the proof combining with (4.4).
Set ψ n (0) = 1. Then by Harnack's inequality [22, Corollary 9.25] and (4.2) we have for any compact set K ⊂ B n , {ψ n : n ≥ 1} uniformly bounded in W 2,p (K), p > d (see (3.5) ). By a standard diagonalization argument we can extract a subsequence of {ψ n : n ≥ 1} that converges to some
is any sub-sequential limit of (ψ n , λ n ), as obtained above, then we have V ∈ C 2 (R d ) and
Proof. Since ψ n converges to V along some subsequence, strongly in C 1,α loc (R d ), α ∈ (0, 1), and weakly in W 2,p loc (R d ), p > 1, we can pass limit in (4.1) to obtain (4.5). Regularity of V can be improved to C 2 (R d ) using ellipticity of a, (A1) and standard elliptic regularity estimates. Now fix x ∈ R d and choose n large enough so that x ∈ B n . Recall the outer maximizing selector v n 2 from Lemma 4.1. Then for any
almost surely for s < τ n . Thus following a similar calculation as in Lemma 4.1 (see (4.3)) we obtain
Since U 1 has been chosen arbitrarily we get λ n ≤ inf
Following result shows that Λ, obtained in Lemma 4.2, is actually value of the game. 
Thus we haveΛ = Λ = Λ for all x ∈ R d .
Proof. Fix an outer minimizer v * 1 of (4.5) and consider the maximization problem with r(x,ũ 2 ) = c(x, v * 1 (x),ũ 2 ) maximize E x (r, U 2 ), over U 2 .
From Theroem 3.1 we know that there exists a stationary Markov control w * 2 which is optimal for the above maximization problem. Moreover, if λ max is the maximum value we have λ max = E x (c, v * 1 , w * 2 ) for all x. On the other hand from (4.5) we have 1 2
Therefore by the definition of principal eigenvalue (2.10) we see that Λ is bigger than the principal eigenvalue of
. Combining with Lemma 2.1 we have
This proves (4.7). Since Λ ≤Λ in general, it follows from Lemma 4.2 thatΛ = Λ = Λ for all x ∈ R d . Now onwards we fix an outer maximizing strategy v * 2 and outer minimizing strategy v * 1 of (4.5). Let us now show that the value Λ is achieved by applying the strategy v * = (v * 1 , v * 2 ). Lemma 4.4. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Let (V, Λ) be an eigenpair obtained in Lemma 4.2. Then we have a compact ball B such that for any compact ball B 1 ⊃ B we have
1 ,
Then following the calculations of Lemma 3.3, we can find a compact set B such that for any compact ball B 1 ⊃ B we have 
In other words, (v * 1 , v * 2 ) is a saddle point strategy. Proof. The first inequality in (4.11) follows from (4.8). So we only prove the second inequality. Let us first show that for any stationary Markov control v :
The proof of (4.12) is based on the method of contradiction. Hence we can multiply V by a suitable positive constant so that V − V ≥ 0 and attends its minimum 0 in B 1 . Moreover, from (4.13) and (4.15) we also have
Thus by strong maximum principle [22, Theorem 9 .6] we should have V = V which would lead to λ v ≥ Λ from (4.13) and (4.15) . This is a contradiction. Hence we have (4.12). Now to compete the proof of (4.11) we consider the following minimization problem inf
But this problem has a minimizer in the class of stationary Markov controls. This can be seen mimicking the arguments of [3, Theorem 4.1 and 4.2] for measurable cost functions (see also Section 3 for a similar argument). Then the second inequality in (4.11) follows from (4.12).
Now we are ready to prove the uniqueness of the value function. 
